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Introduction
A young girl is shot in the face, leaving a gaping hole in her cheek for
over 25 years.1 A four-year old girl is born with an exposed bladder.2 Seven
† Cornell Law School, Candidate for JD, 2015. I would like to thank Professor
Mills for his guidance and assistance with writing on a topic that means so much to my
family and me; Professors Ndulo and Rana for their continued support and feedback;
and the members of the journal for their hard work. Most importantly, I would like to
thank my family. Musa and Hamza, thanks for not ganging up on me too much now
that I am the shortest sibling. Hoyo and Aabo, thank you for always encouraging me to
be authentic and independent— you are the strongest people I know.
1. Australia Approves Ayaan’s Visa!, EDNA ADAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, http://www.
ednahospital.org/2014/01/australia-approves-ayaans-visa/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 417 (2014)
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children have hydrocephalus, causing their brains to swell with fluid that
needs to be drained through sophisticated procedure.3
These are just a few of the patients seen in the only maternity hospital
in Somaliland. It is the only maternity hospital in the nation, due in part to
limited funding opportunities for maternal and child health. Each of these
stories ends in success, but not because of international organizations that
donate directly to foreign governments. Why are international organizations not part of this success?
Somaliland does not have access to foreign aid because it has not been
recognized by the international community as a state.4 Somaliland is a
semi-autonomous region in the Horn of Africa,5 which was under the British Protectorate until June 26, 1960, when the nation declared its independence.6 For the next five days, the United Nations and thirty-five
countries— including the United States— recognized Somaliland as an independent nation.7 On July 1, 1960, Somaliland united with its neighbor to
the south, Italian Somalia.8 With unification came the fulfillment of a
decades-long campaign for a “Greater Somalia.” It became immediately
clear, however, that although the majority of the unified population shared
the same ethnicity, religion, and language, these were sharply distinct
nations.9 Despite stark differences, there still was promise for “Greater
Somalia” until 1969, when President Sharmarke was assassinated in an
otherwise bloodless coup.10 The Siyad Barre regime that followed led to a
devastating Civil War that left 250,000 to 300,000 people— mostly
marginalized Somalilanders, such as the Bantu, Digil, Bravani, and
Rahanweyn— dead.11 In May of 1991, Somalis residing in the North convened in the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples.12 At the conference, Somaliland revoked the Act of Union that had legitimized the
unionization of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, and declared its
2. Edna Assists Baby Hoodo, EDNA ADAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, http://www.ednahospital.org/2013/08/edna-assists-baby-hoodo/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
3. Recent Achievements at Edna Hospital, EDNA ADAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, http://
www.ednahospital.org/2011/03/recent-achievements-at-edna-hospital/ (last visited Aug
8, 2014).
4. Ed Stoddard, Somaliland blessed by dodging aid ‘curse’: minister, REUTERS (Feb. 4,
2014, 12:05pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/us-africa-mining-somaliland-idUSBREA1316Y20140204 (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
5. MARK BRADBURY, BECOMING SOMALILAND 4 (2008).
6. Id. at 32.
7. Peter J. Schraeder, Why the United States Should Recognize Somaliland’s Independence, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, https://csis.org/print/13836 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2014).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 32 (“The former colonies had developed
different administrative systems, police forces, taxes, currencies and education systems,
and they conducted official affairs in different languages.”).
10. See id. at 35.
11. See id. at 47. Somalia’s government led a counter-offense attack in Hargeisa and
Burco, the two major cities of Somaliland that killed “tens of thousands of civilians [and]
forced hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Ethiopia.” Id. at 45-46.
12. Id. at 80.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN204.txt

2014

For Better or For Worse?

unknown

Seq: 3

9-OCT-14

14:11

419

independence.13
Since 1991, Somaliland has flourished with the emergence of a strong
democratic government14 and economic growth.15 Despite Somaliland’s
high-functioning government, Somaliland is not recognized as an independent state within the international community; instead, the international
community recognizes Somalia as the territorial sovereign of Somaliland.16
Somalia, however, has not been able to exert any semblance of control over
Somaliland because of Somalia’s status as a failed state.17 For over twenty
years, the international community has hesitated to recognize Somaliland
as an independent state due to narrow conceptualizations of self-determination and sovereignty.
Traditional notions of sovereignty and self-determination are not easily applicable to unique claims for independence, such as those at issue in
Somaliland. Classic definitions describe sovereignty as “the absolute and
perpetual power of a commonwealth.”18 Sovereignty, at its core, goes to
the rights of a state. In contrast, self-determination goes to a people’s right
to decide which state governs them.
Self-determination in international law is the legal right for a “people”
to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign.19 Traditionally,
the right to self-determination is available to all colonized groups.20 By
1970, many states had attained international recognition as the conclusion
13. Id. at 82.
14. See, e.g., id. at 184. Since 1991, Somaliland has held two democratic elections
that were observed by the international community. See also id. at 192-93. Furthermore, the U.S.-based International Republican Institute and the National Endowment for
Democracy highlighted Somaliland’s democratic success, stating “Somaliland’s embrace
of democracy, its persistence in holding round after round of elections, both winners
and losers abiding by the rules, the involvement of the grassroots, the positive role of
traditional authorities, the culture of negotiation and conflict resolution, the temperance
of ethnicity or clan affiliation and its deployment for constructive purposes, the adaptation of modern technology, the conservative use of limited resources, and the support of
the diaspora and the professional and intellectual classes are some of the more outstanding features of Somaliland’s political culture that are often sorely lacking elsewhere.” See
Schraeder, supra note 4, at 2.
15. See, e.g., Nicholas Eubank, Taxation, Political Accountability, and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland, JOURNAL OF DEV. STUDIES (forthcoming Mar. 26, 2011), at 7.
16. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 5 (“Most fundamentally, after a decade and a
half Somaliland’s sovereignty claim remains unrecognized by Somalis in Somalia or any
foreign government, and is contested by a significant proportion of the people populating eastern Sanaag and Sool regions of Somaliland.”).
17. See, e.g., Brian Jones, The Worst Place in the World: See What Life is Like in
Somalia, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 19, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
somalia-is-the-most-failed-state-on-earth-2013-7?op=1. However, Somalia’s government
was recently recognized as functional by the United States. See, e.g., Tom Watkins, After
More Than 2 Decades, U.S. Recognizes Somalia, CNN (Jan. 17, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/us/somalia-recognition/.
18. RICHARD JOYCE, COMPETING SOVEREIGNTIES 47 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Self-Determination (International Law), LEGAL INFO. INST. (Mar. 23,
2014), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law.
20. MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
(2013).
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to the decolonization process.21 Over time, however, the international
community has grown to regard self-determination with suspicion due to
frequent attempts by separatist minority groups to challenge a state’s territorial integrity.22 To prevent these separatist challenges, limitations to selfdetermination have developed. Both external and internal limitations to
self-determination make it nearly impossible for a non-colonized people to
obtain independence, including Somalilanders,23 due to strict adherence to
Somalia’s right to territorial sovereignty. But Somaliland has continued to
act as an independent state, which has left people in both nations confused. The tension between the traditional notions of sovereignty and selfdetermination has led the world to ignore Somaliland’s democratic and
economic achievements. For reasons that will be explored in this paper,
Somaliland’s intent to function as an independent state should no longer
be ignored.
This Note argues that Somaliland’s commitment to independence
highlights an inability to reconcile traditional notions of sovereignty with
self-determination. This tension can be resolved through a flexible,
nuanced approach to both concepts that still preserves the spirit of sovereignty and self-determination. Part I discusses the history of Somaliland,
including its independence from the British, unification with Italian
Somalia, and reassertion of independence in 1991. Part II discusses the
traditional definitions of sovereignty and the shift to a modern understanding of sovereignty. Part III discusses the evolution of the right to self-determination and the underlying theories that motivate international support
for the right of a people to choose who governs them. Part IV discusses the
tension between sovereignty and self-determination. Part V provides a
potential remedy to alleviate the tension with an analysis of the emerging
doctrine of earned sovereignty as applied to Somaliland.
I.

The Struggle for Independence in Somaliland

A.

Creation of “Greater Somalia”

Prior to 1960, Somaliland (North) and Somalia (South) were two distinct nations.24 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Great Britain
began to occupy the coastal regions of Somaliland.25 Initially, Britain’s
interest in Somaliland was limited to commercial and geopolitical interests,
primarily the protection of valuable trade routes to Asia.26 After twenty
years of uprisings by Somalis, the British began to expand their control
inland.27 Despite expansion, Britain maintained a system of indirect rule,
which limited the “resistance to colonialism by reinforcing traditional
21. Id. at 11-12.
22. Id. at 18.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 32.
25. Id. at 25.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 27-29. Even though Great Britain expanded further into Somaliland, Great
Britain was not interested in making Somaliland a formal colony. Britain’s use of “indi-
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forms of authority.”28 The British maintained this system by working
within Somaliland’s clan-based hierarchy and elevating clan elders to positions with state authority.29
While limited investment in British Somaliland left rural society
largely untouched and did not significantly alter the country’s political
structure, Italy engaged in a brutal assault on Somalis living in Italian
Somalia.30 As the Italian government established its sphere of influence in
Italian Somalia, World War II broke out.31 The Italians briefly occupied
British Somaliland in 1941, but were pushed back into Italian Somalia and
Ethiopia. In 1948, Somaliland became a British Protectorate while Italian
Somalia was placed under U.N. Trusteeship.32
After World War II, a rise in Somali nationalism took over the region.
The concept of a “Greater Somalia” was pursued vigorously with blind
faith, overshadowing the underlying historical, political and economic differences between the two regions.33 The goal of a “Greater Somalia” was to
unite the predominantly Somali regions of East Africa.34 However, there
was no agenda for addressing the distinct problems regarding
underdevelopment in both nations, nor did anyone consider the mechanics
of integrating the two territories.35 Simply put, no one paid attention to
merging the two regions’ separate institutions. For example, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia had different administrative systems, police
forces, taxes, currencies and education systems, and they conducted official affairs in different languages.36 This dual colonial heritage led to further fragmentation of the legal system, which was tasked with unifying and
reconciling four distinct legal traditions.37
Ultimately, political actors ignored these cracks in the “Greater
Somalia” scheme. Intellectual and political elites in British Somaliland and
rect rule” in Somaliland was yet another reason why Somaliland and Italian Somalia
clashed; Italian Somalia was governed more aggressively by Italy. See id. at 28.
28. Id. at 28-29. “[O]ne legacy of indirect rule in Somaliland was to reinforce indigenous political institutions in a way that has proved vital to the ability of people in Somaliland to reconstitute a polity in the aftermath of the civil war.” Id. at 29.
29. Id. at 28-29. (“As new forms of wealth accumulated in the state, the role of clan
leadership changed from managing kinship relations and entitlements to pastoral
resources to also managing access to the political and economic benefits of the state,
such as the right to export [licenses], the collection of taxes or the ownership of wells.”).
30. Id. at 29. For example, an Italian company was accused of perpetuating slavery
in 1900. Italy wanted to both create a colony as a source of primary goods and a place
for settlement.
31. Id. at 30 (noting that for a brief time during World War II, Italy occupied Somaliland, but the British managed to reclaim Somaliland in 1941).
32. Id. at 31 (granting independence was scheduled for 1960).
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 24 (“Aspirations of Somalis to re-unite the ‘lost’ Somali territories in a
Greater Somalia have subsequently driven national politics and regional conflicts.”).
Greater Somalia would have united five regions: Djibouti, Ogaden in Ethiopia, Northeastern Kenya, British Somaliland, and Italian Somalia. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id.
37. Id. (“The new Republic had four distinct legal traditions: British common law,
Italian law, Islamic shari’a and Somali customary law.”).
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Italian Somalia discussed unification as early as April 1960.38 On June 26,
1960, Somaliland obtained independence from Great Britain.39 Five days
later, Italian Somalia also declared independence.40 That same day, in a
rush towards unification, the two nations became Somalia.41
After unification, the two nations tried to bridge the gap between their
respective political and administrative frameworks only to find resistance
from the other nation. A day after decolonization from the British, Somaliland drafted and signed an Act of Union, thus validating unification with
Italian Somalia.42 To legally bind both states, representatives of the South
needed to sign the document as well;43 instead, the South passed the Atto
di Unione, which differed significantly from the North’s Act of Union.44 In
response, Northerners declared that the Atto di Unione did not carry the
force of law because the document had never been ratified by the Somaliland legislature.45 The North’s dissatisfaction was ignored. The North registered its discontent when more than half of the Northern electorate voted
against the provisional constitution.46 Later that same year, British-trained
Northern officers attempted a coup to end the Union and failed.47 The
North only began to accept the Union when Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, an
Isaaq and Somaliland’s former Prime Minister, was appointed Prime Minis38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. The schedule of U.N. trusteeship declared Italian Somalia would
decolonize by July 1, 1960.
41. Id. But, unlike half the marriages in the U.S., this unification could not be
annulled. See National Marriage and Divorce Trends, CDC.ORG, (last visited Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm.
42. BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 33.
43. See id.
44. Ibrahim Hashi Jama, Somaliland & Somalia: The 1960 Act of Union – An Early
Lesson for Somaliland, SOMALILAND LAND (2006), http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Act_of_Union.htm (“Thus, although the clear plan and agreement between Somaliland and Somalia was that the same Act of Union will be signed by both states, the
legal formalities, as agreed, were not completed properly and, according to [author
Paolo] Contini, ‘the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law did not have any legal validity in the South (Somalia) and the approval “in principle” of the Atto di Unione was not
sufficient to make it legally binding in that territory.” See also Dimitrios Lalos, Between
Statehood and Somalia: Reflections of Somaliland Statehood, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 789, 792 (2011).
45. See BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 33. See also Jama, supra note 44 (“[Author Eugene]
Cotran comments that the legal validity of the legislative instruments establishing the
union were ‘questionable’ and he summarizes the reasons as follows: (a) The Union of
Somaliland and Somalia Law and the Somalia Act of Union were both drafted in the
form of bilateral agreements, but neither of them was signed by the representatives of
the two territories. (b) The Union of Somaliland and Somalia purported to derogate in
some respects from the Constitution of the Somali Republic. (c) The Somalia Act of
Union was approved ‘in principle’ but never enacted into law. (d) The decree law of July
1, 1960, did not come into effect since it was not converted into law in accordance with
the Constitution.”
46. BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 33. The vote, however, was carried by a majority in the
South although the legitimacy of the vote is questionable. Id.
47. Id. “Charges of treason against them were dismissed by a judge on the grounds
that, in the absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland.
The rejectionists [of the Atto di Unione] took this as vindication of their case.” Id.
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ter of Somalia in 1967.48 Unfortunately this moment of acceptance was all
too brief. In October of 1969, President Sharmarke was assassinated and
Siyad Barre took over Somalia in a bloodless coup.49 Somalia’s unified
democracy lasted only nine years.50
B.

Collapse of Somalia and Rise of Somaliland

Barre hoped to fulfill the promise of “Greater Somalia” through the
creation of a military state which, at its peak, emphasized nationalism and
loyalty.51 Barre promoted nationalism by getting the international community invested in the “Greater Somalia” movement.52 Somalia received support from the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East to recapture all five
regions.53 After losing the Ogaden War, Somalia lost these benefactors, but
soon gained the support of the United States, Italy, and other Western
donors.54 The ideology behind a “Greater Somalia” began to disintegrate
due to both the loss of the war with Ethiopia over Ogaden and the decision
of the people in Djibouti to seek independence rather than unite with
Somalia.55
The loss of nationalism combined with the creation of a military state
led to the formation of rebel groups. In 1981, the Isaaq clan that resided in
the North formed the Somaliland National Movement (SNM).56 The crisis
between the North and South escalated in May of 1988 when the South
signed a peace agreement with Ethiopia.57 Fearing that the North would
soon lose its military bases after Somalia’s new alignment with Ethiopia,
the SNM attacked the Somali army in the Northern cities.58 To undermine
support, Barre directed offensive military strikes at the North’s two major
cities: Hargeisa and Burco.59 Barre sent pilots to bomb civilians throughout the North as well. Over 50,000 Northerners were killed in major
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 35 (stating that a military regime governed Somalia for the next 21 years
under the Somali Revolutionary Council. Major-General Siad Barre was the leader of the
coup, and the next President of Somalia).
50. Id. at 33– 35.
51. Id. at 36 (saying Barre also promoted loyalty by campaigning against tribalism
by, among other means, ceremonial burning of effigies of tribalism, elimination of blood
compensation, and the stripping of marriages of their clan significance). See also I.M.
LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE SOMALI 209-11 (4th ed. 2002).
52. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 42.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 42, 44-45 (noting that motivations for Western involvement was, in part,
due to concerns that the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Libya and some of the Gulf States (such
as Iran and Yemen) could prevent access to Middle East oil).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 39.
57. Id. at 45-46.
58. Id.
59. See Brad Poore, Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117,
129 (2009) (quoting 417 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 273WH (statement of Tony
Worthington)). Hargeisa and Burao are now the primary and secondary capitals of
Somaliland respectively. Interview with Yusuf Xasan, Somaliland citizen, in Hargeisa,
Somaliland (May 1, 2009).
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Northern cities alone,60 and hundreds of thousands died throughout the
rest of the former Protectorate.61 Those who survived the bombings were
subsequently rounded up and shot to death.62
Despite the serious losses, the SNM recaptured all of the major Northern cities in 1991.63 Somalia could not continue its widespread atrocities
as it lost funding from Western nations.64 Later that year, the SNM convened in the Great Conference of the Northern Peoples,65 and on May 18,
1991, Somaliland revoked the Atto di Unione and declared independence
from Somalia.66
The international community is unsure how to treat Somaliland’s second declaration for independence. Somaliland has argued that it has
always maintained its independence.67 Furthermore, Somaliland’s borders
reflect its old colonial borders.68 Thus, its second independence constituted “the dissolution of a voluntary union between sovereign states.”69
The international community, however, is hesitant to intrude on Somalia’s
right to sovereignty and has therefore denied Somaliland’s right to selfdetermination.70 Somaliland’s unique situation calls for a deeper understanding of sovereignty and self-determination in order to resolve whether
Somaliland should be recognized as an independent state.
II.

Sovereignty

A.

Origins of Sovereignty

The work of Jean Bodin is one of the earliest sources for the modern
idea of sovereignty. Bodin defined sovereignty as the “absolute and perpet60. Poore, supra note 59.
61. Id. See also DEON GELDENHUYS, CONTESTED STATES IN WORLD POLITICS 131 (2009)
(“By the time the SNM had finally defeated central forces in Somaliland in early 1991,
between 50,000 and 100,000 people may have died in the hostilities and another
500,000 displaced. [Hargeisa] was roughly 90 per cent destroyed.”).
62. See Poore, supra note 59, at 130.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 44. The publicity of human rights violations
led many Western donors to withdraw their financial support from Somalia. For example, in January 1990 the US Congress passed the “Brooke Amendment,” which halted
any non-humanitarian aid to Somalia. “Bilateral aid was cut from US$30 million in
1988, to $740,000 for 1990.” Id.
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 82.
67. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 132.
68. E.W., Somaliland: Can’t Get No Recognition, THE ECONOMIST (Jan 9, 2014,
7:50am), http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/01/somaliland.
69. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 135. In fact, Somaliland’s argument is not
unique. Senegal, Gambia, Mali and Egypt all were allowed to regain their sovereignty
upon the dissolution of unsuccessful unions. Id. See also Schraeder, supra note 7, at 1
(citing East Timor, Eritrea, and successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as additional examples).
70. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 143 (“One reason, especially pertinent in
Africa, was a dogmatic commitment to the sanctity of inherited colonial borders and
hence a deep-seated antipathy to secession.”).
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ual power of a commonwealth.”71 Sovereignty is unlimited in power, function, and length of time; Bodin claimed that an absolute sovereign
“recognizes nothing after God that is greater than himself.”72 This traditional notion of sovereignty has faced challenges as the world has increasingly globalized.73 Anne-Marie Slaughter notes that “[t]o exercise
[sovereignty as a supreme authority and control over policy] in a world that
has become so interconnected that people, politics, and pathogens are virtually able to disregard borders requires institutionalized cooperation and
intervention.”74 Going further, Raustiala believes that the shift in sovereignty from domestic authority and control to authority and control from
outside institutions represents a loss of sovereignty.75
B.

Modern Approach to Sovereignty in Globalized World

To redefine sovereignty in the context of globalization, Stephen Krasner offers four frameworks for conceptualizing sovereignty in the modern
world.76 Krasner first identifies “legal sovereignty,” where states recognize
one another as independent territories.77 Second, Krasner identifies “interdependence sovereignty,” in which a state controls the movements across
its borders.78 Third, Krasner identifies “domestic sovereignty” as the standard definition of sovereignty.79 “Domestic sovereignty” refers to the effectiveness of governmental authority and control within the state’s
territory.80 Fourth, Krasner identifies “Westphalian sovereignty,” where
states have the right to separately determine their own domestic authority
structures without external interference.81 In addition to his four views on
sovereignty, Krasner provides four situations where sovereignty is trumped
in favor of outside intervention: (1) religious toleration; (2) minority rights;
(3) human rights; and (4) international stability.82
In contrast to Krasner, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes
have argued that sovereignty has a new meaning as our world becomes
increasingly interdependent:
71. See JOYCE, supra note 18, at 47.
72. Id.
73. Former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, “It is undeniable that
the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and
was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory.” Michael P. Scharf,
Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 373
(2004).
74. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 288 (2004).
75. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 417
(2000).
76. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 13 (explaining this as an eroding mechanism of sovereignty due to aspects
of globalization (such as capital flows, migration, and ideas) as a way in which the
power of sovereignty in states is being increasingly lessened.).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 20-21.
82. Id. at 46; see also Slaughter, supra note 74, at 283.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-2\CIN204.txt

426

unknown

Seq: 10

9-OCT-14

Cornell International Law Journal

14:11

Vol. 47

Our argument . . . is that[ ] for all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty
no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their
perceived self-interest, but in membership in good standing in the regimes
that make up the substance of international life. To be a player, a state must
submit to the pressures that international regulations impose. . . . Sovereignty, in the end— is status— the vindication of the state’s existence as a
member of the international system.83

This “new sovereignty” measures a state’s sovereignty through the ability and capacity for a state to participate in the international institutions
that allow their members to accomplish tasks that, under Bodin’s notion of
sovereignty, a state could once accomplish alone.84 Chayes’ conceptualization of “new sovereignty” can be classified as status, membership, a connection to the rest of the world, and the political ability to be an actor
within it.85 For example, a state that is a member of the United Nations
(U.N.) signifies that the state accepts the right of its fellow U.N. members
to intervene in its domestic affairs if the state has failed in its obligation to
protect its own citizens. Chayes’ concept of “new sovereignty” represents
centuries of evolution within the doctrine of sovereignty to accommodate
globalization; in contrast, the right to self-determination has barely altered
in form and function since its inception in the early 20th century.
III.
A.

Right to Self-Determination
Development of the Right to Self-Determination

Prior to World War I, self-determination was not a matter of concern
for the international community. When a group or national movement
gained independence from its mother states, the rest of the world would
simply acknowledge the group’s statehood.86 Self-determination as a
human right gained momentum post-World War I as Austria-Hungary
broke into different states.87 Leaders such as Vladmir Lenin and Woodrow
Wilson were advocates for self-determination; Lenin advocated violent
secession to liberate people from bourgeois governments, and Wilson
advocated the exercise of free will through the democratic process.88 Wilson believed that the essence of the right to self-determination stems from
the general democratic principle of people consenting to be governed.89
Self-determination acquired the status of a legal right after World War
II.90 The U.N. first discussed self-determination as a protected interest in
83. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995).
84. See Slaughter, supra note 74, at 286.
85. Id.
86. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 21-22.
87. Id.; See also SIMONE F. VAN DEN DRIEST, REMEDIAL SECESSION 16 (2013).
88. See ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 19-20 (2007).
89. Id.
90. VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 16.
WITH INTERNATIONAL
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the U.N. Charter.91 While establishing a general right to self-determination, the U.N. Charter did not specify the criteria necessary for a state to
gain the right.92 Instead, the U.N. Charter proposed that member states
should allow minority groups the opportunity to separate from their
mother state, or the right for colonized peoples to achieve independence.93
Two decades later, the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights as well as the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenants) reaffirmed the right of people to self-determination.94 These two
treaties brought new meaning to self-determination by creating an obligation for member states to “respect a people’s right to . . . democratic selfgovernance.”95 The treaties also expressed self-determination within two
frameworks based on colonization.96 Colonized peoples had a less steep
hill to climb to gain independence compared to non-colonized peoples.
Colonized peoples acquired the right to self-determination automatically
once the Covenants were ratified, whereas non-colonized people did not
automatically acquire the right to seek independence from their mother
states.97
The right to self-determination continued to be widely accepted in the
1950s with the prevalence of colonialism.98 States recognized that
oppressed colonized groups ought to have the right to choose their political
status.99 People living within a colonial territory have a right to self-determination as a unit; if various ethnic groups live in a single colony, the
colony has to exercise the right to self-determination as a whole.100 All
ethnic groups have to unite as a single “self” that corresponded to the
91. Article 1(2), U.N. Charter provided that one of the purposes of the organization
was “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” The UN Charter did not define selfdetermination. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
92. STERIO, supra note 20, at 10.
93. Id.
94. United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 1966; United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 1966. Article 1 of both covenants provide that: “[a]ll people have the right
to self-determination. . . . The State Parties to the present Covenant, including those
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
95. STERIO, supra note 20, at 11. A distinguishing feature of the two covenants is that
the ICESCR used stronger language towards self-determination, by stating that “all peoples have the right of self-determination” whereas the ICCPR calls for “immediate
respect.” Thomas D. Grant, Review Article: Between Diversity and Disorder: A Review of
Jori C. Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-Determination and Statehood, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 629, 634 (1997).
96. STERIO, supra note 20, at 11.
97. Id. The Covenants granted peoples of dependent territories (colonies and trusts)
the right to freely decide their political fate by allowing them “to form an independent
state or to remain a part of their existing colonizer or to associate with another state.” Id.
Colonized states could rely on the Covenants to seek a legally binding separation from
their colonizer. Id.
98. See VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 29, 32.
99. Id. at 31.
100. Id. at 31-32.
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entire territory of the colony.101 The one drawback for a colonized group
is that once a colonized people have exercised their right to self-determination that right expires.102 Once a colonized people form an independent
state, they are classified as non-colonized people. They are then entitled
only to a form of internal governance within their new state.103
Because this right to self-determination expires, self-determination
has lost substantial support.104 Separatist minority groups throughout the
world began challenging the concept of state territorial integrity by calling
for a right to self-determination for their groups.105 A general fear that
numerous minority groups will claim a right to self-determination became
prevalent within the international community.106 In response, nations
have found ways to limit the definition of self-determination through different theories of recognition.
B.

Theories of Recognition

The ultimate success of a state’s secession is dependent on recognition
by the international community.107 Other nations may recognize the legitimacy of secession based on several geopolitical factors.108 There are two
main theories of recognition: the declaratory theory and constitutive theory.109 A state’s recognition is based on an analysis through the
frameworks of one or both theories.
The declaratory theory of recognition is premised on the objective criteria for statehood outlined under the Montevideo Convention. Signed in
1933, the Montevideo Convention outlined the criteria required for a state
to become recognized: the state must have (1) a permanent population; (2)
a defined territory; (3) effective government; and (4) the capacity to enter
into relations with other states.110 If the four requirements are met, recog101. This concept flows from the principle of uti possidetis, leading toward the respect
of colonial borders and their elevation to the status of international frontiers. Id. at 21.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 11.
104. The popularity of self-determination declined as the prevalence for colonial
states decreased dramatically after the 1970’s. Id. at 13-14. In fact, Professor Van Nanda,
a leading scholar in the self-determination debate, has argued that claims to self-determination by non-colonial groups would rise quickly, so the international community
should propose a new method of determining the right to self-determination. See, e.g.,
Ved. P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law – The Tragic Tale of Two Cities –
Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 321, 322 (1972).
105. STERIO, supra note 20, at 1.
106. Id. at 19. Antonio Cassese commented that “[t]o explore self-determination is
also a way of opening a veritable Pandora’s box” because “[i]n every corner of the globe
peoples are claiming the right to self-determination. Id. at 2. Former UN SecretaryGeneral U. Thant went so far as to say: “As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a State is concerned, the United Nations attitude is unequivocal. As an
international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member
States.” Id. at 25.
107. See id. at 48.
108. See id. at 47.
109. Id. at 48.
110. VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 32.
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nition is not necessary; rather, recognition acts instead as evidence of
statehood.111
Domestic and international courts, including federal courts in the
United States and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have applied the
declaratory theory.112 For example, the Second Circuit applied the declaratory standard in Kadic v. Karadzic.113 In Kadic, the court was asked to
determine whether the leadership of Srpska, a self-proclaimed republic,
could be held liable for various human rights atrocities carried out by its
leaders.114 The court held that Srpska met the definition of a state because
Srpska “is alleged to control defined territory, control populations within
this power, and to have entered into agreements with other governments.”115 Despite this being the favored theory by commentators,116 a
state will still probably not obtain international rights unless the international community recognizes it.117
The constitutive theory of recognition reflects the realities of state recognition by providing that statehood is dependent on recognition by the
international community.118 State recognition is not automatic under the
constitutive theory.119 Existing states act as gatekeepers to ensure that de
facto states meet the criteria under the Montevideo Convention.120 Commentators argue that the gatekeeper function turns recognition into a political instrument with powerful states essentially exercising veto power.121
Neither theory is the “correct” or dispositive theory in establishing
statehood recognition. New states sometimes qualify as a state under the
constitutive theory but not the declaratory theory, and vice versa.122 Ultimately, recognition is not only dependent on the theory used, but is also
dependent on the context surrounding a state’s secession.
111. Id.
112. See e.g. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the existence
of jurisdiction over Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb
republic of Srpska).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 236-37.
115. Id. at 245.
116. The declaratory theory is the more favored approach because it is considered to
be the more legal and politically correct framework. See, e.g., William Worster, Sovereignty: Two Competing Theories of State Recognition, EXPLORING GEOPOLITICS (Feb. 2010),
http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Worster_Willliam_Sovereignty_Constitutive_Declatory_Statehood_Recognition_Legal_View_International_Law_Court_Justice_Montevideo_Genocide_Convention.html.
117. STERIO, supra note 20, at 48.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. Political maneuvering means that a failed state may remain viable as a political tool in the international community. “[W]here doubts remain as to the factual fulfillment of the requirements necessary for statehood . . . recognition assumes an important
(political) function: it translates international politics determined by domestic policies
into international law.” Lalos, supra note 44, at 800.
122. Arguably, Bosnia-Herzegovina would not satisfy the criteria for the Montevideo
Convention under the declaratory theory. Somaliland and Taiwan, however, satisfy the
declaratory theory but fail under the constitutive theory. See Worster, supra note 116.
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Current Status of Self-Determination

Self-determination is a rule of customary international law that
declares the legal right for a “people” to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign.123 The principle of self-determination is currently
embodied in several international treaties and conventions.124 States typically seek secession in response to the mother state’s failure of governance
and the exclusion of minority groups in running affairs of the state.125
Secession is considered a remedy of last resort “that may come into play
when it is the sole means by which a substate group can exercise its right
of political participation on a basis of equality.”126 Because secession is a
remedy of last resort, a valid exercise of self-determination is difficult to
achieve. First, a group claiming the right to self-determination must be
categorized as a people, not simply a minority group.127 Second, the people’s circumstances must fit under the definition of external selfdetermination.128
Self-determination is limited to a group that consider themselves a
“people.” Generally, a “people” is a group of individuals living in the same
territory.129 A “people” is not defined strictly based on ethnicity, religion,
or language. The broad construction of “people” is to create a limiting
principle for the right to self-determination.130 The right to self-determination is not available to minority groups solely based on their minority status.131 While all minority groups are entitled to a level of protection by the
mother state, “there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all” if every minority group had a right to
self-determination.132 Thus, the distinction between peoples and a minority group is critical to evaluating a claim for self-determination.
The international community analyzes a group of individuals under a
two-part test to determine whether the group should be categorized as a
123. Some have argued that a state that violates the right of self-determination of its
peoples is “nothing more than a ‘fabricated state’ because it has manipulated statehood.”
Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1994). The
classical view of self-determination— that it’s a right preserved for colonial people— has
acquired jus cogens status. See also Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving
Self-Determination and Secession at International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 553, 567
(2010).
124. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 13.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 20.
127. See id. at 16.
128. See id.
129. See id. See also Grant, supra note 95, at 637 (according to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, “a community is: [A] group of persons living in a given country or
locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this
identity of race, religion, language, and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a
view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the
instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions
of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other”).
130. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 16-17
131. See id.
132. Id. at 18.
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minority group or a “people” for the purposes of self-determination.133 The
test has both an objective and subjective component. The objective test
evaluates the group to determine to what extent its members share common characteristics such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and
cultural heritage.134 The international community also determines if the
group of individuals shares a common territory.135 The subjective component of the test examines how individuals within the group perceive themselves.136 Considerations for the subjective component include a shared
sense of values, a common goal for the group’s future, and the degree to
which the group can form a viable political entity.137 Classification as a
“people” does not demonstrate the right to exercise secession; rather, it
triggers the right to internal self-determination.138
There are two forms of self-determination: internal and external selfdetermination.139 The distinction between internal and external self-determination serves the purpose of limiting secession to extremely narrow circumstances, because “[t]he right to opposed unilateral secession stands in
obvious tension with the claim to territorial integrity and unity of existing
states.”140 Thus, international law aims to preserve territorial integrity of
existing states, except in truly unique circumstances.141
Internal self-determination is premised on the beliefs that individuals
should have cultural, social, political, linguistic, and religious rights and
that these rights need to be respected by the mother state.142 Internal selfdetermination’s focus on social and political rights aligns with Woodrow
Wilson’s belief that self-determination reflects the right to democratic process and representation.143 At the end of the 20th century, internal selfdetermination gained substantial support when the Supreme Court of
Canada established the right to internal self-determination in Reference re
133. See id. at 16. See also Grant, supra note 95, at 637.
134. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 17. While all minority groups are entitled to a level
of protection by their mother state, their protection stems from the mother state’s commitment to human rights. See id. at 18.
135. See id. at 16. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, para.
126 (holding that the right to internal self-determination is “a people’s pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state.”).
136. STERIO, supra note 20, at 16.
137. See id. at 16-18.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 21 (quoting Marc Weller).
141. UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the
Rights of Peoples. Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 Feb. 1990, SHS-89/
CONF.602/7, at para. 5 (“There is an understandable fear that, understood in one way,
the peoples’ right to self-determination might lead to the fragmentation of States, the
disruption of settled international boundaries, the breakdown of governmental authority and even manipulation of peoples for the purpose of disrupting the internal affairs of
States.”). See also STERIO, supra note 20, at 19.
142. See also STERIO, supra note 20, at 19.
143. Id.
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Secession of Quebec.144 In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that Quebec cannot unilaterally secede from Canada because the right to
self-determination could only be exercised within the framework of
Canada’s political system.145 A referendum held by Quebecers was insufficient to trigger the right to self-determination; rather, Canada as a whole
had to vote on whether Quebec could secede from the nation.146 The
Court did hold that the Canadian government would be required to negotiate with Quebec based on the outcome of the referendum.147 According to
the Court, however, only extreme circumstances could override the state’s
interest of territorial integrity.148
External self-determination applies to the small number of cases when
extreme circumstances override the state’s interest of territorial integrity.149 External self-determination signifies that a group of people seeks
to separate from the mother state in order to self-govern.150 External selfdetermination stems from the Friendly Relations Declarations, which
states that such separation can take place through the “establishment of
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State, or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people.”151 In practice, the external right to selfdetermination is exercised through one of the following methods: the
peaceful dissolution of a State, the reunion or merger of one state with
another state, or secession.152 Reunion or merger is the rare instance
where two or more states unite to create a new sovereign state.153

144. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217 (adopting the Declaration
on Friendly Relations’ definition of external self-determination, which is “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that
people”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. STERIO, supra note 20, at 19.
150. Id.
151. See VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 85; See also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, UN Doc. A/RES/2625
(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
152. See VAN DEN DRIEST, supra note 87, at 85. In addition to these modes of implementing the right to external self-determination, the text of the Friendly Relations Declaration concerning the right to self-determination is generally seen to give rise to a right
to independence for the population of a State whose territory has been annexed or occupied by foreign powers. As such, the exercise of the right to self-determination should
not be viewed as the creation of a new, independent State but as the de facto re-establishment of the independence of a state. Id.
153. Id. at 86-87. The state does not need to have been previously united. An example of reunion or merger is the unification of East and West Germany. Id.
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Tension between Sovereignty and Self-Determination
Two Jus Cogens Norms at War

There has been difficulty reconciling self-determination with sovereignty. The right to territorial integrity is inherent to sovereignty, but both
self-determination and sovereignty are jus cogens norms that the international community has long recognized. Historically, state recognition was
a necessary requirement for an entity to become a member of the small
community of “civilized” states.154 But the situation changed when France
prematurely recognized the United States. Great Britain viewed France’s
recognition as an intervention in its internal affairs.155 Self-determination
then became “a political and discretionary act ‘determined solely by considerations of convenience or national interests.’ ”156
In modern society, tension between sovereignty and self-determination is exacerbated by the use of recognition as a political tool within the
international community. Self-determination is successful only when the
international community recognizes the state. However, is the international community then asserting sovereignty over an otherwise independent state? Raustiala briefly discusses how “[m]any analysts conceive
sovereignty in terms of ‘local (domestic) authority and control, and thus
the shifting of authority and control to outside (international) institutions
represents a loss of sovereignty.’ ”157 A further indication of a loss of sovereignty is seen with the emergence of provisional sovereignties. Concern
with provisional sovereignties demonstrates the “pervasive substantive limitations on the capacity of weak states to shape domestic decisionmaking.”158
Some critics are not only skeptical of provisional sovereignties, but are
vehemently opposed to any watered-down definition of sovereignty.
Mahmood Mandani argues that there is a “new humanitarian order” that
evolved in response to postwar decolonization.159 Mandani demonstrates
that as former colonies became independent sovereigns, great powers
found a new way to reassert control: by reconstructing humanitarian
law.160 The responsibility arising from a violation of humanitarian law
initially fell on the state which actively engaged in the violation; now, a
violation of humanitarian law falls on the international community.
Because of this newfound duty to protect all vulnerable populations— a
duty embraced in practice by the UN Security Council where all but one
154. See ABDELHAMID EL OUALI, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 198
(2012).
155. Id. at 272.
156. Id.
157. Raustiala, supra note 75, at 417.
158. Aziz Rana and Asli U. Bali, Pax Arabica?: Provisional Sovereignty and Intervention
in the Arab Uprisings, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 321, 323 (2012).
159. See Mahmood Mandani, The New Humanitarian Order, TheNation.com (Sept. 10,
2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/new-humanitarian-order.
160. Id.
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permanent member were former colonizers161— the great powers found a
way to validate their intervention and infringement on sovereignty.
The international community argues against the proposition that it is
reasserting its power by diminishing another state’s sovereignty by claiming there needs to be some limiting principle to the right of self-determination. Without the international community acting as a state police, every
minority group will want to assert their right to self-determination.162
This fear has led to a presumption against recognizing states.163 But a
more elaborate explanation of the tension between sovereignty and selfdetermination is evident through the rule of the great powers.
B.

The Rule of Great Powers: A New Theory of Self-Determination

An alternative theory of self-determination is the great powers rule.
Under this theory, Milena Sterio argues that any entity claiming a right to
self-determination has to demonstrate four criteria for recognition by the
international community.164 Through these criteria, a group receives validation by the international community to become a state. The four criteria
include: “a showing by the relevant people that it has been oppressed, that
its central government is relatively weak, that it has been administered by
some international organization or group, and that it has garnered the support of the most powerful states on our planet.”165 The fourth element to
this rule— support of the most powerful states— carries the most weight and
tends to be dispositive for a successful claim of self-determination.166
Sterio delves further into the rule of great powers by demonstrating
how much power strong nations have over the future of struggling minority
groups and their mother states. By oppression, Sterio emphasizes the portrayal of secessionist groups by the great powers. The great powers “must
accept that the mother state is at fault and that the minority group represents the victim” in order for the minority group to claim oppression.167
To determine whether the mother state’s central government is weak, a
great power typically will help weaken that government by strategically aiding a minority group.168 The third prong— involvement of international
161. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are: China, France,
Russian Federation, the U.K., and the U.S. All but China colonized other parts of the
world: France, Russia, and the U.K. have all colonized parts of the Horn of Africa alone
and the U.S. has colonies in Oceania and the Caribbean. United Nations Security Council
Members, UNITED NATIONS (last visited May 5, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.
162. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 20-21.
163. Geldenhuys, Contested States in Africa, SOMALILAND CYBERSPACE (Feb. 17, 2010)
http://www.mbali.info/doc556.htm (“This is coupled with an almost pathological fear
of setting precedents that would encourage disaffected ethnic minorities to break away
from existing states.”).
164. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 57.
165. Id.
166. Sterio goes further to say that the support of the great powers swallows the other
three criteria. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
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organizations— is dependent on other nations acknowledging and prioritizing the minority group’s struggle for self-determination. This is best
reflected when looking at the United Nations Security Council. The
United Nations Security Council exercises great control in what groups
receive assistance from the organization. Five nations— all great powers—
exercise veto power in the Security Council, “thereby precluding any
United Nations’ involvement, if they deem that a self-determination struggle is not worthy of their concern or not deserving of their help.”169 The
great powers support ultimately determines the fate of most minority
groups trying to claim a right to self-determination, fulfilling the fourth
criteria.
C.

Defining the Great Powers

In order to apply the rule of great powers, the nations that encompass
the “great powers” must first be defined. The great powers “are states that
wield the most financial, strategic, political, and military power on our
planet.”170 They have an enhanced status that allows them to exercise
great influence in a coercive manner against other states. Great powers
also enjoy positions within international institutions, and sometimes
occupy prominent positions.171 Regional organizations and international
courts provide yet another platform for great powers to enjoy an elevated
status.172
The influence of the great powers impedes on the traditional legal and
political power a state may have against other states. For example, great
powers may engage in interventions, thereby offending other states’ sovereignty.173 Great powers have created international tribunals and led criminal proceedings against leaders from weaker states.174 Through their
immense influence, great powers have reduced the sovereignty of other
states.
The great powers in our modern society include “the United States,
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. In addition to the United Nations Security Council, almost all great powers have
an elevated position within specialized international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO). Id. at 58.
172. Certain powers routinely have representation on the International Court of Justice through de facto permanent judges. See id. Additionally, critics have argued that
the International Criminal Court has become a tool for the great powers, such as the
United States, to target African leaders for crimes in an international forum. See, e.g.,
Mahmood Mandani, The New Humanitarian Order, THE NATION (Sept. 10, 2008), http://
www.thenation.com/print/article/new-humanitarian-order (“[T]ake into account the
four countries where the ICC has launched its investigations: Sudan, Uganda, Central
African Republic and Congo. All are places where the United States has no major objection to the course chartered by ICC investigations. [T]he ICC is rapidly turning into a
Western court to try African crimes against humanity.”).
173. STERIO, supra note 20, at 58.
174. Id. Some have criticized the great powers for abusing their status to target African states in international criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Mandani, supra note 172.
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Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.”175 Some claim
that China and India are new additions to this exclusive club.176 These
nine nations have attained their status as a great power through different
means. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia achieved their
status through historical privileges after World War II.177 The more recent
additions— China and India— have achieved their status through their enormous industrial growth, manufacturing base, work ethic, and emphasis on
education.178
Others have argued that in addition to historical and newer
powerhouses, two other categories of states deserve the status of great
powers: (1) non-declared nuclear states and(2) rogue and volatile states.179
Non-declared nuclear states, such as Israel and Pakistan, exercise enormous power through the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. These states
can exercise powers normally reserved for the great powers with the knowledge that few countries would retaliate for fear of nuclear warfare.180
Rogue and volatile states wield power through their extremely unpredictable behavior, which makes it difficult for the traditional great powers to
exercise influence.181 Because these states have their own enhanced financial, political, or military power, they are able to engage in risky diplomatic, political, and military actions without concern for retaliation.182
Rogue and volatile states are powerful because they are willing to do almost
anything, rendering great powers helpless to retaliate. Ultimately, the historical definition of great powers best explains the influence of other
nations on self-determination by analyzing the four criteria and its effect
on self-determination movements throughout the 20th century.
D.

Criteria for the Great Powers Approach to Self-Determination

Under the rule of great powers, a group of people seeking self-determination has to satisfy four criteria: “it has to show that it has been
oppressed, that its central government is relatively weak, that it has already
been administered in some form by some international organization, and
that it has the support of the great powers.”183
175. M.J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”?
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 364, 381 (2005) (stating that the Great Powers can “cross
theoretically unbreachable frontiers either individually or collectively” through somewhat justifiable state interventions).
176. STERIO, supra note 20, at 59.
177. These nations also make up four of the five states with veto power on the United
Nations Security Council. They attained their seats in part because these four nations
were the only four that had the capacity to fulfill the Security Council’s Article VII power
to take measures against threats to peace. Id. at 45, 58-59.
178. See id. at 59.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 57.
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First, a group typically demonstrates that it is oppressed by getting
international attention through the atrocities it faces at the hands of its
central government.184 Mild human rights violations usually do not
attract enough attention to persuade the great powers to act.185 Therefore,
groups that have satisfied the oppression prong demonstrate “a high level
of suffering and a consistent policy of harsh abuse by the government.”186
For example, the East Timorese demonstrated the abuse they faced under
Indonesia’s power that led to a referendum vote on independence.187 On
the other hand, the Quebecois in Canada were unable to satisfy the oppression prong because the central Canadian government allowed Quebecois to
participate in high levels of government.188 The international community
ultimately balances the degree of suffering to determine whether it is worth
the effort to interfere with another state’s sovereignty.
Second, a group of people must demonstrate that their mother state’s
central government is relatively weak and incapable of administering to the
people’s province or region. Groups seeking self-determination easily
demonstrate that their central government is unable to assert proper control militarily, politically, or structurally.189 Breakaway regions such as
South Sudan, East Timor, and Kosovo have successfully argued their rights
to self-determination partly because Sudan, Indonesia, and Serbia were
unable to control violence and warfare in the regions.190 A few groups,
however, have had difficulty separating because of their central government’s strength.191 Again, the international community will balance the
stability of the central government to determine whether a group has the
right to self-determination.
Third, a group seeking self-determination must demonstrate that its
region needed international help in some capacity because of the “brutality
and inefficacy of the central government.”192 This prong is a derivative of
the second criteria: once a group has successfully shown it is governed by a
weak central government, international authorities intervene to preserve or
re-establish peace.193 For example, NATO, the U.N., and the European
Union have all had a presence in Kosovo in its struggle for independence;
184. Id. at 60.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 61
187. See id. at 62.
188. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 SCR 217, ¶ 65 (1998) (“In individual terms,
the right to vote in elections to the [Canadian] House of Commons and the provincial
legislatures, and to be candidates in those elections, is guaranteed to ‘Every citizen of
Canada’ . . . Historically, this Court has interpreted democracy to mean the process of
representative and responsible government and the right of citizens to participate in the
political process as voters . . . and as candidates.”).
189. STERIO, supra note 20, at 62.
190. Id.
191. For example, the Kurds have been denied external self-determination by the government of Turkey because of the strength of Turkey’s central government. See, e.g., M.J.
Kelly, supra note 175, at 390.
192. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 60.
193. Id. at 62.
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the U.N. led the referendum effort for East Timor and helped orchestrate
South Sudan’s independence.194 But groups that had strong central governments, such as Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, were unable to
satisfy this third prong to the great powers approach.195 A higher degree of
involvement by the international community significantly improves a
group’s chances of attaining self-determination.
Lastly, a group seeking self-determination “must prove that external
actors, including the great powers, view its struggle as legitimate, and that
external actors, including the great powers, are ready to embrace it as a
new sovereign partner.”196 Sterio asserts that this fourth prong is dispositive for a group of people to gain recognition. For example, Kosovar Albanians declared independence from Serbia in 2008.197 All the great powers,
excluding Russia, immediately recognized Kosovo as a new state.198 The
support from the great powers helped Kosovo in two critical ways. First,
the support of virtually all of the great powers led Kosovo to declare independence with confidence.199 Second, many neutral states accepted
Kosovo once they saw the support of the great powers.200 The influence of
the great powers also can be seen through South Sudan’s struggle for independence. South Sudan was unable to gain international recognition until
the group garnered United States’ support.201 Therefore, only entities that
have had the support of at least one of the great powers have succeeded in
gaining international recognition.202
E.

The Great Powers Influence on Somaliland

The influence of the great powers on Somaliland’s claim for recognition cannot be understated. The great powers theory of recognition calls
for (1) oppression; (2) weak central government of the mother state; (3)
some involvement by international authorities; and (4) external actors
viewing the claim as legitimate. All but the last claim have been satisfied
time and time again in the case of Somaliland.
In viewing oppression, there must be a balance between the degree of
suffering of a people and the protection of state sovereignty. The civil war
between Somalia and Somaliland led to the deaths of thousands of Somalilanders through tactics such as destroying major Northern cities and
rounding up Somalilanders for execution.203 Even prior to the civil war,
194. See, e.g., id. at 62.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 63.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. The South Sudanese were ignored by the international community throughout
the Cold War and in the 1990s. After 9/11, the Western great powers began to fear the
rise of an influential Islamic state and thus turned to supporting South Sudan in order
to weaken Sudan’s central government. Id.
202. Others, such as the Biafrans and the Kurds, are forced to co-exist within their
original mother states. Id.
203. See Poore, supra note 59, at 128. See also GELDENHUYS, supra note 61, at 131.
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there were concerns of oppression when former Somalilanders were routinely excluded from political positions of power.204
The second requirement to the great powers theory for self-determination calls for a weak mother state. Somalia’s inability to function as a government for a majority of Somaliland’s renewed existence is clear. Since
the fall of Barre’s regime in 1991, clan warlords, militants, and Al
Shabaab— a group with connections to Al Qaeda— have fought for control
over the region, while a shaky transitional federal government has tried to
maintain control.205 Somalia’s federal government has failed to prevent Al
Shabaab’s bombings in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, or in surrounding
regions. Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for various types of suicide
attacks, “typically targeting Somali government officials, [African Union
Mission in Somalia], and perceived allies of the [Somali Federal Government].”206 While Somalia’s government has been recognized as functional,207 Al Shabaab has continued to be a threat within Somalia and in
neighboring countries.208
The third requirement for the great powers theory is the involvement
of international authorities who intervene to preserve or re-establish peace
due to the ineffectiveness of the weak central government. Many of the
great powers— in particular, the U.S. and U.K.— have intervened repeatedly
in Somalia prior to Somaliland’s independence in 1991,209 and have continued to intervene post-independence.210
Where Somaliland struggles is the fourth prong of the great powers
theory: whether external actors believe that their claim to recognition is
legitimate. Numerous countries, including some of the great powers, have
a diplomatic relationship with Somaliland,211 but none have officially recognized Somaliland. The U.S. has distanced itself from Somaliland’s struggle for independence by reverting to the concept of “African solutions for
African problems.”212 Jendayi Frazer, in her capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs for the U.S., stated that the U.S. would
recognize Somaliland if the African Union (A.U.) first recognized Somali204. Former Somalilanders did not believe they were represented fairly until the
appointment of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal in 1967. See BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 34.
205. See Watkins, supra note 17.
206. Al-Shabaab, THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, http://www.nctc.gov/
site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
207. See Watkins, supra note 17.
208. Al Shabaab most recently gained widespread publicity through their terrorist
attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. See, e.g., id.; Al-Shabab Terrorists in Training
Find Inspiration in Kenya Mall Attack, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/bb/world-jan-june14-shabab_01-07/.
209. See, e.g., BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 42-44.
210. See, e.g., http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm#p15.
211. Somaliland has relationships with the U.S., U.K., and France. Somaliland also
holds diplomatic offices in Sweden, Kenya, Ethiopia, Norway, Belgium, Djibouti, South
Sudan, and Canada. Contracts and Addresses of the Somaliland Representative Offices
Around the World, THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND (last accessed May 11, 2014), http://
somalilandgov.com/country-profile/embasies/.
212. Schraeder, supra note 7.
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land.213 More than 5 years have passed since Frazer’s statement, but the
A.U. is not any closer to recognizing Somaliland.
F.

Politics or International Law?

Through the great powers theory of self-determination, it is clear that
the great powers legitimize a people’s struggle for self-determination. But
should the great powers’ political views override the international law on
self-determination? Groups seeking self-determination are left wondering
what motivates the great powers in their decisions to support or not support a struggling group. If the great powers decide to not give media coverage to a struggling people, then those people will remain unnoticed on the
global scene.214 If a great power sees that self-determination will allow
them to achieve unrelated personal goals, it will provide the support necessary for a group to attain international recognition. A great power may
also choose not to interfere with a group’s struggle for self-determination in
fear of angering another great power.215
While the great powers have to prioritize their own nation’s policy
interests, it is legally inappropriate to rest the law of self-determination on
a handful of nations with a disproportionate amount of power. Sterio
points out that the legal criteria for self-determination has been “brushed
aside by the great powers’ rule.”216 Somaliland’s argument for self-determination highlights the tension between the legal approach to self-determination and the political interests of the great powers. Throughout
Somaliland’s recent history, many of the great powers have offered support
to both the Somali government and Somalilanders, including the United
States, United Kingdom, Russia, and China.217 The doctrine of earned
sovereignty has been proposed as a solution to the rule of great powers,
and, more broadly, self-determination in the post-colonial world.
V.

Solution to the Tension: Earned Sovereignty

A.

Emergence of Earned Sovereignty
A new approach to attaining independence focuses on demonstrating

213. Jamal Gabobe, What Jendayi Frazer Said About Somaliland and Somalia, THE
SOMALILAND TIMES, available at http://somalilandtimes.net/sl/2008/332/71.shtml.
214. For example, the world has heard little about Tibet in recent years due to China’s
totalitarian control of all national media outlets. See Sterio, supra note 20, at 64. But the
genocide in Darfur, Sudan by the Janjaweed militia groups with alleged support from the
Sudanese government was largely ignored until 2003 when media outlets were able to
broadcast the atrocities. See id.
215. For example, the great powers have turned a blind eye to Chechnya due to the
significant interest of a key great power, Russia. See id. at 66.
216. Id. at 69.
217. BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 42. Somalia and Somaliland not only changed alliances with nations, but their form of government as well – from protectorate under the
United Nations, to communism, to a shaky form of democracy. See Ssekandi, Somali FM
Hails Somalia-China Relations, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN, Jan. 30, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/africa/2013-01/30/c_132139474.htm.
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to the outside world that the state has “earned” its right to sovereignty.218
Earned sovereignty is the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate under international
supervision.219 The doctrine emerged from the fourth criterion of the
Montevideo Convention, “the capacity to enter into international relations.”220 Earned sovereignty has its origins in the peace agreements relating to the state practice of Serbia and Montenegro, East Timor, the
Northern Ireland and Bougainville agreements, and the proposed agreements for the Palestine Road Map and Western Sahara.221 The purpose of
earned sovereignty is to:
seek[ ] to bridge the approaches of sovereignty and self-determination by
providing a mechanism whereby some substate entities may be guided
through a process of transition to statehood or heightened autonomy in such
a way so as not to undermine the legitimate interests of parent states and of
the international community.222

It is designed to create an avenue for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts
by providing for the managed devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a state to substate entity.223 It also acts as a reward for states
that have achieved statehood through peaceful interactions with the international community.224 In some instances, the substate entity may
acquire authority and functions sufficient to enable it to seek international
recognition, while in others the substate entity may only acquire authority
to operate within a stable system of heightened autonomy.225
Earned sovereignty first appeared under the name “intermediate sovereignty” in a 1998 memorandum issued by the Public International Law &
Policy Group and the International Crisis Group as a proposed solution to
the conflict in Kosovo.226 Earned sovereignty has been successfully used
as an approach to resolving conflict in both Kosovo and South Sudan.227
There are three core elements to earned sovereignty and three optional
elements. The core elements are: (1) shared sovereignty, (2) institution
building, and (3) eventual determination of the state’s final status.228
Shared sovereignty represents the state and substate entity both exercising
sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory.229 Institution
218. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 175.
219. See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Future of Sovereignty-Based Conflict
Resolution, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 128, 131.
220. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 175.
221. Williams, supra note 219, at 131.
222. Id. at 134.
223. Id.
224. See STERIO, supra note 20, at 175. For example, peoples such as the Kosovar
Albanians or the East Timorese have earned their right to exist as independent states,
whereas peoples that have been labeled violent such as Republika Srpska or Chechnya
have not. Id.
225. Williams, supra note 219, at 134.
226. Id. at 132.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 135.
229. Id.
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building represents when the substate entity, sometimes with assistance
from the international community, undertakes to construct institutions for
self-government and build institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.230 Eventual determination of the final status of the substate entity is usually determined by a referendum.
Sometimes, the final status of the substate entity is determined through a
negotiated settlement between the state and substate entity with the assistance of an international mediator.231
The three optional elements of earned sovereignty are: (1) phased sovereignty, (2) conditional sovereignty, and (3) constrained sovereignty.232
Phased sovereignty is defined as the accumulation by the substate entity of
increasing sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of
time prior to the determination of final status.233 Conditional sovereignty
lists certain benchmarks that the substate entity is required to meet.234
Conditional sovereignty may be applied to the accumulation of increasing
sovereign authority and functions by the substate entity, or applied to the
determination of the substate’s final status.235 Lastly, constrained sovereignty involves continued limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as continued international administrative and
military presence.236 It also provides limits on the right of the state to
undertake territorial association with other states.237
Critics like Mandani view any threat to sovereignty as intolerable,
thereby treating earned sovereignty with suspicion. Concerns of ethnonationalism and population transfers that the successor states to the Soviet
Union and former Yugoslavia faced come to mind as well. Would Somaliland fall into a similar trap? These concerns that Somaliland will fall into a
pattern similar to the Soviet Union may be unwarranted. While ethnonationalism through the “Greater Somalia” mission led to the unification of
Somalia and Somaliland, the boundary split between the two nations
reflects the clan divisions. As I.M. Lewis, a widely recognized anthropologist on the Somali people, has observed: “clanship remains a more comprehensively powerful focus of identity in Somali society.”238 The difference
between clanship and ethnicity has a huge practical implication in Somalia
and Somaliland’s case: “solidarity at the level of the ethnic group (the
nation) is less binding than that within the clan structure.”239 The concerns arising from a theoretical analysis of earned sovereignty, therefore,
are not as prevalent here.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 136
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id.at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I. M. Lewis, Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox, 74(4) AFR.:
JOURNAL OF THE INT’L AFRI. INST. 489, 511 (2004).
239. Id.
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Somaliland’s Earned Sovereignty

Somaliland’s case for independence satisfies the underlying purpose
of earned sovereignty by maintaining peace while striving for increased
power over its territory. Since 1991, Somaliland has worked with international organizations and other nations to help provide peace and stability
to the region.240 Because Somaliland has functioned for twenty years without any supervision from the international community, Somaliland’s claim
to recognition does not fit neatly into the three required and three optional
elements of earned sovereignty. Shared sovereignty and phased sovereignty both involve a detailed arrangement for dual sovereignty with the
mother state.241 Through benchmarks for increased transfer of authority
and functions, there is a gradual transformation to democratic rule that
simultaneously respects the territorial integrity of the mother state.242
Somaliland could not engage in either stage because Somalia did not have
a recognized, functioning government until 2013.243 The inability to
engage in dialogue with Somalia’s government forced Somaliland to continue on its path to recognition.
The difficulty in line drawing as to where Somaliland lies in the
earned sovereignty scheme can easily be remedied by the actions of the
international community. The crucial element missing from the three-part
test for earned sovereignty is a timeline for the determination of final status. The international community needs to help Somalia and Somaliland
determine a deadline for when Somaliland will be recognized as independent by the international community; such a deadline would be similar to
the deadlines set for U.N. trusteeships. It is typical for the international
community— even after independence— to continue to monitor certain
tasks to ensure the continued compliance with the prior phase
conditions.244
Somaliland has managed to develop a state structure comprised of a
popularly elected constitutionally-based government.245 The government
has certain enumerated rights, and has been able to fulfill their duties
through exercising some “control over its borders, manag[ing] certain public assets, lev[ying] taxes, intervene[ing] in the market, formulat[ing] development policies and provid[ing] security for its citizens as competently as
many better resourced and recognized states in Africa.”246 Somaliland has
240. See BRADBURY, supra note 5, at 243-44.
241. See Williams, supra note 219, at 135-36.
242. See id.
243. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 17.
244. See Williams, supra note 219, at 135. For example, the international community,
through a U.N. commission, had set a clear date for determining the final status of
Kosovo at the Raimbouillet Accords, the commission’s initial meetings. The determination of final status was then transformed into an ongoing process in the United Nations
Standards before Status doctrine “whereby the international community required that
the conditions in [prior phases] be substantially met prior to undertaking negotiations
to settle Kosovo’s status.” Id.
245. See BRADBURY, supra note 5.
246. Id.
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also managed to facilitate growth in the economic sector through the rehabilitation of infrastructure and social services.247 Most Somalilanders who
took refuge in neighboring countries during the war have returned, and
civil organizations have flourished.248
Conclusion
Over the last twenty-three years, Somaliland has gone from destruction
and despair to a self-governing territory that fulfills the criteria for statehood. Mark Bradbury, a social analyst who has worked extensively in
Somalia and Somaliland, suggests that the key to reconciling the right to
territorial sovereignty and self-determination is through an ad hoc, factintensive analysis in order to “understand the place on its own terms.”249
The rule of great powers suggests that politics, more than international
law, has dictated what groups are able to recognize their right to self-determination. From this understanding, it is clear that the international community has a responsibility to rise up and take the lead in resolving this
issue. More importantly, an understanding of state building can help us
with all nations that are emerging from civil war.

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.

